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The politics of valuation and payment for regenerative medicine products in the UK 
 
Authors: Alex Faulkner and Aurélie Mahalatchimy 
Abstract 
The field of regenerative medicine (RM) faces many challenges, including funding. Framing 
the analysis in terms of institutional politics, valuation studies and ‘technologies of 
knowledge’, the paper highlights growing debates about payment for RM in the UK, setting 
this alongside escalating policy debates about ‘value’. We draw on interviews and publicly 
available material to identify the interacting and conflicting positions of institutional 
stakeholders. It is concluded that while there is some common ground between institutional 
stakeholders such as industry and health system gatekeepers, there is significant conflict 
about reward systems, technology assessment methodologies and payment scenarios; a range 
of mostly conditional payment schemes and non-mainstream routes are being experimented 
with. We argue that current developments highlight a fundamental conflict between a concern 
for the societal value of medical technologies in a resource-limited system and a concern for 
engineering new reward and payment models to accommodate RM innovations.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Keywords: Regenerative Medicine, valuation, payment scenarios 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Regenerative medicine (RM) is acknowledged as a potentially game-changing set of 
innovations that could transform the practice of medicine. This field entails the use of human 
or animal-derived cells, tissues or genetically- modified cells as interventional therapeutics 
with the aim of repair or regeneration of damaged or malfunctioning cells, tissues or organs. 
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RM is championed as a potential source of cure for many medical conditions. Although the 
field consists of a wide variety of different products and processes, especially spanning the 
established sectors of both medicines and medical devices, the UK has defined RM per se as 
one of ‘eight great technologies’ (Willetts, 2013). The field is positioned at the forefront of 
the ‘health and wealth’ agendas of UK and global initiatives for the bioeconomy (OECD, 
2009; Gardner et al, 2016). A range of initiatives has been launched to identify innovation 
challenges of RM, and to devise strategies for addressing them.  
 
Overall, the RM field is beset with a wide range of uncertainties. These include complex 
regulatory frameworks; manufacturing issues; research governance; clinical trial 
methodologies; potential disruption to clinical environments; lack of investment from private 
funders; and lack of viable payment systems (Gardner et al, 2016, Gardner et al, 2015).  The 
UK Government’s official response to a 2016 inquiry into regenerative medicine included the 
following recommendation (referring to NICE – the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence, the central national health technology assessment institution): 
The next Government should…work with the biotech sector and with NHS 
England and NICE to agree new reimbursement payment models which take greater 
account of the value of regenerative medicine therapies that offer cures, reduce 
healthcare costs and make treatments available earlier to patients (Department of 
Health, 2017:11) 
This dense and multidimensional statement encapsulates two related concepts, first that of 
payment for regenerative products, and second, the concept of ‘value’, which has become key 
to recent debates and analysis in Western advanced healthcare economies where policy must 
take account of limited resources for public healthcare systems and of public concern about 
societal access to and safety of innovative technologies. Further, it conjures three domains of 
value – curability, cost and access. 
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This paper, then, investigates the twin issues of payment and value. Needless to say, without 
viable systems to reward producers in some way, the promise of RM cannot be fulfilled. Such 
issues have generated significant debate, as only a small number of RM products have 
actually reached the marketplace, and several high-profile products have been withdrawn by 
their producers for business reasons. At the same time, a few are being introduced clinically 
through a variety of non-mainstream regulatory and marketing routes to small numbers of 
patients. The curative potential of some RM innovations presents technology assessment and 
payment systems with novel challenges, while others are less disruptive suggesting a possible 
diversification of subsectors in the future, in spite of the government framing it as a single 
sector. For example, cell therapies produced by a standardised process are very different from 
a medical device based, ‘tissue-engineered’ customised product for a single patient. 
Developers are typically only able to provide evidence about preclinical and clinical quality, 
safety and efficacy that is even less than for other novel medical products, because 
performance metrics for cell-based technologies have yet to be clearly defined.  
 
Payment is not the only means by which producers of RM might be rewarded and its value 
recognised. It has become apparent, as the above Government statement illustrates, that the 
debates and proposals about the funding of RM products have become implicated in, and are 
contributing to, a broader debate about methods and approaches to ‘valuing’ innovative 
medical products in society more broadly. As Health Technology Assessment (HTA) leaders 
internationally have stated: ‘Identifying treatments that offer value and value for money is 
becoming increasingly important, with interest in how HTA and decision makers can take 
appropriate account of what is of value to patients and to society, and in the relationship 
between innovation and assessments of value’ (Henshall and Schuller, 2013). Such a 
statement about the multidimensional worth of treatments is significantly broader and indeed 
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at odds with narrower yet high-profile perspectives of value defined by medical outcomes 
(e.g. Porter, 2010). Thus, it is necessary to appraise issues of potential payment systems 
alongside the possible methods of assessing the ‘value’ of potential innovations in the 
medicines and medical devices sectors, and beyond healthcare systems, in wider perspectives 
of society and the economy. A range of stakeholders is thus engaged in debating the imagined 
future of RM healthcare, and in this paper we focus primarily on the UK where a range of 
notable recent developments in the institutional and methodological politics of RM payment 
and broader valuation and reward is evident. 
Apart from the move within HTA to take greater cognisance of value, ‘valuation’ has 
emerged recently as a major focus in sociological studies of economics processes. Helgesson 
and Kjellberg (2013) have outlined trends in this field: ‘These studies address how actors 
accommodate and mediate a wide variety of value registers as part of performing markets’ 
(p361). Valuation studies are ‘examining the multiplicity and disputability of registers of 
value, valuation practices, metrics and processes’ (ibid, p363). Valuation thus focuses on the 
processes by which different values are mobilised in the formation of new markets, and 
‘values’ themselves express the multiple and variable worth that actors attribute to products 
entering into those markets. Relevant values in any given case may thus include, for example, 
economic, societal, health-related values, and social ethics. 
 
Institutional and methodological politics of value 
 
The innovation landscape for RM is inhabited by a complex array of actors with widely 
varying aims, expertise and resources. To examine the relevant actors here is to examine what 
MacKenzie has called ‘the politics of market design’ (2009). The actors involved include 
market regulators and health technology assessors (acting as ‘gatekeepers’ of entry to 
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healthcare adoption), payers (public health system providers, private medical insurers), 
innovation intermediaries and promoters, research and opinion publishers, charities, patient 
groups, industry trade organisations, health policymakers, business incubators and investors, 
and civil society organisations. These actors attempt to negotiate the valuation of the worth of 
RM products and businesses, possible payment systems (conventionally called 
‘reimbursement’), and the associated processes of HTA (Garrido et al, 2008).  
 
Given the interaction between interest-driven institutions, an ‘institutional politics’ approach 
is appropriate as one conceptual strand for understanding the dynamics of valuation positions 
that may structure RM’s emergence. This approach has been used in analysing other fields of 
public policy where decision-making methodologies are established around particular 
measurement technologies (e.g. Porter and Demeritt, 2012). A second strand of our 
conceptual approach, in work bridging political and economic sociology, assumes that 
‘contentiousness’ is fundamental to the ‘legitimation of new market categories’ such as 
industrial sectors (King and Pearce, 2010; Lamont, 2012). Struggles to establish new 
categories are part of stakeholders’ strategies. Actors at the margins may be key to innovation 
(Mennicken and Sjogren, 2015), as has been described for example in the US grass-fed beef 
and dairy markets (Weber et al, 2008 cited in King and Pearce, 2010). In the RM case, actors 
‘at the margins’ of the central policy regimes are essentially the biomedical innovators - small 
and large companies and their representative associations, specialist innovation promotion 
agencies, and clinical and academic research communities, and these actors contend with 
established, central gatekeeping, health service planning, and technology assessment 
institutions such as NICE, and their methodologies. A third strand of our approach 
acknowledges the importance of endemic knowledge practices in valuation processes. 
Methodological ‘machineries’ or ‘technologies’ of knowledge (Knorr-Cetina, 1999) partly 
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constitute the epistemic cultures that structure particular fields. Epistemological assumptions 
and methodological tools become deeply embedded in the operations of public policy and 
planning institutions, providing ways of comprehending their domains and making policy 
judgments (cf. Porter and Demeritt, 2012). The ascription of meaning, therefore, is a 
necessary precursor to the constitution of value. As Roscoe has stated, ‘value depends upon 
the epistemic’ (2015:27). In the case at hand, multiple meanings or ‘identities’ (Ulucanlar et 
al, 2012; Gardner et al, 2016) may be ascribed to different medical technologies by different 
actors through their technologies of knowledge, and value may be ascribed to them through 
their institutional tools and processes of judgment of worth. In other words, tools of 
calculation are implicated in processes of defining ‘what counts’ or ‘what matters’. Here, we 
will show how the concept of ‘reimbursement’, deployed in the government response above, 
is a heavily-laden signifier in scenarios for RM products’ future viability, directing the debate 
to a particular market-based vision of ‘what matters’ in RM valuation, pointing toward a 
payment-for-products model of the arrangements between producers and the public 
healthcare system or insurer as purchaser. A key example of an epistemic valuation 
technology to be discussed below is the ‘Quality- Adjusted Life Year’ (QALY)1 the 
methodological bedrock of NICE in the UK (NICE, 2014). 
 
Drawing on these related analytic approaches, it will also be instructive to compare the 
epistemic, methodological and institutional conflicts - understood as divergences of 
views/perceptions- illustrated in this paper with comparable developments studied in other 
nascent industries. Notably, Pallesen (2016) has discussed value and payment issues in terms 
of a ‘politics of pricing’ in the wind power market (in France), proposing that that case 
illustrates continuous struggles in four dimensions: the framing of the public interest; 
valuation as the articulation of the future; alternative possible agencies of governance; and 
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the role of valuation methods and calculations (Pallesen, 2016). Taking these four dimensions 
as a starting point, we propose that all of our analysis of values, valuation and payment 
scenarios is about ‘the articulation of the future’. We build on Pallesen’s notion, noting that 
the articulation of the future has to take place in the context of ‘inherited’ (Stokes, 2012) 
regulatory classifications, organisational infrastructures, budget categories and so on, without 
which future scenarios have no purchase. Evidence of this was prominent in our study. We 
refer also to Pallesen’s other three dimensions in our analysis, going further to detail the 
positions, arguments and stakeholder actors in struggles over the healthcare adoptability of 
RM products, and suggesting that the RM case has become one in which the problematic 
value politics of the public good has become acute. 
 
Thus, given this methodological approach, we set out to ask which institutional actors are 
developing what positions and how do they agree or diverge? What quantifiable technologies 
of knowledge are proposed and defended? And, pace Pallesen, what are the values, valuation 
processes and actors that contest what counts as ‘good’ public value, and how do these relate 
to possible payment systems or other modes of reward? As stated, our focus is primarily on 
the United Kingdom and its National Health Service (NHS) public healthcare system, with 
some reference to debate in other European Union (EU) states where it is prominent, such as 
Germany. Reimbursement to producers of medicines and medical technologies is essentially 
a national responsibility not governed by supra-national political regimes, though recent 
regulatory developments such as ‘conditional authorisation’ and ‘early access’ are supported 
at EU level (see section ‘Valuation through market-building and payment scenarios’ below). 
  
Methodology 
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Our methodology was based on semi- structured interviews with key stakeholders in 2015 
and 2016 and documentary material. Ethics approval was obtained from the University of 
XXXX. We examined the main UK reports on RM, to identify the institutions that have been 
active in the field and to identify potential interviewees. The interviewees and institutions 
included service planners, government-related national bodies (such as sections of the 
government Department of Health) and ethics bodies and agencies, funders, consultants, 
‘innovation networks’ (organisations that promote RM innovation), trade organisations, 
health professional organisations, clinical research centres, journal manager, and patient 
research charities. From a short list of stakeholders we selected 1 to 3 key institutions in each 
category, and 43 interviews were conducted. Our initial interviewees suggested further 
possibilities (i.e. snowballing). We provided an information sheet, asked for signed consent, 
including that interview records be archived in the Economic and Social Data Service. We 
received good rates of acceptance from most categories with the exception of venture capital 
companies and ethical bodies (although a member of the latter answered questions 
informally); nevertheless our data contain many stakeholders’ considerations of ethical 
issues). We interviewed one journal manager. ‘Civil society organisations’ are generally not 
active in the RM field and were not mentioned in the interviews; a member of the wider 
research team interviewed representatives of ten patient research charities (e.g. British Heart 
Foundation), but none of them mentioned reward/reimbursement issues. We classify 
stakeholders broadly in this paper into three types: ‘gatekeepers’ (NICE, NHS England, 
MHRA - Medicine and Healthcare products Regulatory Authority), innovators (companies, 
academic centres, and innovation networks/ promoters), and ‘advisors’ (specialist observers 
and expertise such as IP lawyer, health economists, biotech business consultant). To preserve 
anonymity we refer in the paper to broad categories only. All interviews were transcribed and 
coded in NVivo. Publications searches on key institutions yielded their official positions, and 
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we undertook analysis of recent journal publications on gene therapy. We analysed 
publication trends on RM ‘reimbursement’ which is the topic of a separate paper 
(AUTHORS, 2017). Relevant questions and data for this paper were focused on:  the 
perceived value of RM and RM products, what method stakeholders’ believed should reward 
its producers, and the reasons; whether new methodologies are required to define and assess 
RM products’ value or values; proposals for novel payment schemes or methodologies; and 
whether specific funds should be earmarked for RM. Drawing on systematically coded 
interview transcripts and content analysis of key documents, we derived a set of main themes 
relating to reward/reimbursement in the RM field. These are illustrated and discussed in 
detail below, and comprise: alternative framings of ‘value’ itself (for example ‘public health’, 
‘equality’, or ‘market value’), issues of organisational and budgetary infrastructure of the 
NHS, issues of data collection and clinical ‘evidence’, potential reward/reimbursement 
schemes, and the salience of different RM product types.  
 
Valuation devices and healthcare payment 
NICE and the NHS Executive are the central institutions that have the responsibility 
respectively to evaluate new technologies and if appropriate guide their adoption into the 
healthcare system, and to oversee national-level payment schemes to recompense producers 
such as device or drug companies. NICE’s verdicts on innovations are perceived as crucial to 
their prospects (Rose and Williams, 2012) and its assessment processes and NHS Executive’s 
existing budget infrastructure form the backdrop to the development and debate of new 
scenarios for recompense of RM producers. In other words, the articulation of RM products’ 
value and potential future reward depends on this inherited (and continually changing) 
regime. 
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Conceptually, NICE’s over-riding mission is primarily to ‘make things the same’ 
(Mackenzie, 2009) by applying a standard metric, a machinery of knowledge, to identify the 
technologies most deserving of national adoption. NICE thus acts as a central threshold-
setting institution by deploying the long-established ‘QALY’ methodology. The QALY is a 
key algorithm in national level gatekeeping. Its methodology has become an established 
‘mode of coordination’ (Moreira, 2012). It enshrines an essentially utilitarian approach to 
health technology innovations, seeking to produce the greatest public good for the most 
population. Deployment of the QALY facilitates processes of giving differential value, 
defined in terms of population health gain, to different technologies, so in turn providing for 
resource allocation. It can thus also be understood as an ‘allocation protocol’, to use Roscoe’s 
(2015) term. By using the QALY, NICE’s technology appraisal and advisory committees and 
staff enact a rule that subsumes into its system the contentiousness about ‘value’ that is 
characteristic of the political negotiation of market boundary-work.  
 
We now describe the basic features of how the NHS can introduce a new technology, which 
is defined by NICE and the NHS Executive. It is necessary to bear this in mind when 
considering the value debates and scenarios for reward provided in our data, analysis of 
which follows. Decisions to ‘reimburse’ technologies/services are taken through various 
different pathways (AUTHOR2, 2016). First, two formal pathways at NICE result in 
mandatory decisions: for larger target populations the ‘Technology Appraisal’2 and for rare 
diseases the Highly Specialised Technologies Evaluation (HSTE). If these NICE procedures 
result in negative decisions, manufacturers can propose a Patient Access Scheme (PAS), 
usually a lower price. Manufacturers can also negotiate specific performance related 
agreements (Epstein, 2014). Given the different assessment routes in NICE, the NHS 
Executive may or may not be legally obliged to provide a novel technology through the NHS. 
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This is rarely a straightforward matter not least because of the wide range of possible routes 
of service provision. Most NHS services are paid for under the ‘National Tariff’ system 
(conventionally called the ‘drug tariff’ in spite of not being confined to pharmaceuticals), 
which annually allocates prices to units of care delivery (‘currencies’), enshrined in a 
complex resource coding system (‘Healthcare Resource Groups’ - HRGs). The NHS decides 
on commissioning (contracting and paying for) therapies either at the National Executive 
level for Specialised Services or locally through ‘Clinical Commissioning Groups’ (CCGs) 
led by General Practitioners planning for the local population. It is notable that NHS England 
(NHSE) appointed a National Clinical Director for Regenerative Medicine in 2016 to advise 
on policy, joining a set of some 20 such positions for various services. CCGs could in 
principle decide reimbursement locally including RM treatment, for example treatment for 
chronic diabetic ulcer including tissue-engineered skin substitute. 
 
Very expensive drugs, devices and particular services, especially where only a few centres 
provide them, are reimbursed through the NHS Executive additionally by extra price 
negotiations. Further, certain services can be deemed separate from the tariff as ‘Specialised 
Services’, some cancer services being an example. The unique ‘Cancer Drugs Fund’ (which 
some of our interviewees referred to), was started in 2011 to make certain expensive drugs 
more easily accessible, and was reconfigured in 2016 notably to give NICE a larger role in 
assessing relevant drugs, following criticism from prominent health economists (Claxton, 
2015). The existence of such a fund illustrates the constant tension that exists between the 
kinds of allocation devices deployed by policy institutions such as NICE, and the pull of 
priorities from the ‘political’ domain, mobilising different registers of value, cancer being 
seen politically as a ‘dread disease’ warranting special, exceptional policy treatment. As one 
interviewee commented, clearly drawing on a societal level value-concept of fairness : ‘I 
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think the issue with the Cancer Drugs Fund was that it was set up with no value element 
included in it at all’ (Gatekeeper 3, 2015).  
 
As noted in the introduction to the paper and as the Cancer Drug Fund case illustrates, 
payment or reimbursement is not the only discourse in which the valuation of RM is being 
conducted. The explicit discourse of ‘value’ has grown in the HTA, government health 
department, and health system communities. The NHS Executive refers to ‘Commissioning 
for Value’ (website); the Cell and Gene Therapy Catapult aims ‘to explore models based on 
value’ (website); NICE committees consider the ‘value proposition’ of technologies 
(Campbell, 2012), and economists propose new methods for producing data relevant to 
healthcare value (Epstein et al, 2012). Thus ‘value’ as a symbolic term is itself part of the 
emerging valuation of RM, broadening and indeed challenging the narrower discourse of 
‘reimbursement’. This explicit discourse appeared in our interviews, though it is notable that 
it came mainly from those we defined as consultants and gatekeepers: 
I think in the highly- specialised treatments, they’re in a separate box partly because 
of evidence issues, but mainly because of a sense that you have to apply different 
values. (Consultant 2, 2015) 
Considerations of societal value are seen at NHS system level as challenging basic 
democratic values: 
if you start taking account of wider societal benefit and…things like ability to earn 
money and contribute finances to society, then straight away you start getting into 
some terrible equality issues. (Gatekeeper 3, 2015) 
So the discourse of value can frame the public good in different ways, special cases such as 
therapies for cancer being informed by different values than curative therapies for relatively 
rare genetic diseases. ‘Wider societal benefit’ can be defined in population terms given RM’s 
                          Accepted version. (Version of record published online in New Genetics and Society, 10 July 2018) 
 
13 
 
curative promise (potentially allowing people to resume a ‘contribution to society’), or by 
contrast in public priorities translating latent hierarchies of ‘disease values’ into healthcare 
policies.  
 
Many of our participants approached the RM value issue in terms of the notion of 
‘reimbursement’. Most believed it to be an important issue, with the exception of most of the 
research charities interviewed (9 out of 10), and gatekeepers, for whom payment issues are 
outside their official remit. Most of the innovators, gatekeepers and advisors were aware of 
ongoing discussion in terms of reimbursement. The ‘innovators’ were those most vocally 
concerned about reimbursement. A critical view typical of trade organisation representatives 
was: 
So I think we have the academic excellence, some significant infrastructure, a 
growing community... What we don’t have is a route to reimbursement. (Trade 
organisation 2, 2015) 
Such statements emphasize the reliance of future scenario- building on participants’ 
understandings of the current valuation and payment environment. Our data reveal a wide 
range of features of this existing infrastructure and role definitions amongst the gatekeepers, 
NHS budget structures, and how these impinge on stakeholders’ ‘articulation of the future’. 
Most of the institutional stakeholders had views about organisational aspects of payment 
possibilities seen as problematic given existing infrastructures: 
choosing the right patients to give the right medicine to is going to be problematic. So 
the (payment) system readiness…is (defined by) the currencies of contracts (which) 
will be a barrier... (Innovation network 1, 2015) 
A perceived divide between market regulation and technology assessment, and in addition 
conflict between roles, knowledge practices and organisations was a common theme amongst 
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gatekeepers, including technology assessors, and industry, with a widespread conviction that 
NICE and NHSE should be more coordinated: 
Currently we have NHS England evaluation capability, we have a NICE evaluation 
capability and the two are no longer tightly integrated ... (Trade organisation 4, 2015) 
Gatekeepers, NHS innovation actors and trade organisations all highlighted the existing 
special organisational infrastructures referred to above, which could be exploited for RM 
payment pathways: 
All of these medicines will come under specialised commissioning and there is the 
mechanism there…for commissioning policies to be developed, for the evidence base 
to be reviewed and for recommendations to be made. (Trade organisation 4, 2015) 
It should be noted however that this perspective elides a number of issues. First, the 
assumption that all RM products will be ‘medicines’ with the implication of a 
pharmaceutical-style market for the NHS is certainly a partial representation of the current 
developments in RM products, where small-scale, personalised, surgeon-dependent 
applications, often with a medical device component, are significant. So the powerful agenda-
shaping voice of the pharmaceutical medicines industry is evident here. Second, the statement 
that specialised commissioning will be the norm ignores the likelihood that some RM 
products will be subsumed into existing ‘currencies’ funded under the standard tariff scheme. 
As one gatekeeper noted: 
… if you’re going to have an active dressing for a foot ulcer, that’s not going to be a 
specialist commissioning area. That's going to need to be funded under the drug tariff 
because that takes place in the community…. Whose budget does it come under? 
(National body 1, 2015) 
The design and administration of different NHS (and as the above quote implies, possibly 
social care) budget regimes act as one form of governance that will structure the market for 
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RM products. If a product cannot be fitted easily into an existing ‘currency’, lengthy and 
expensive negotiations would be needed possibly to extend an existing resource group 
definition, if a ‘specialised’ status cannot be given. We reiterate that these regimes are 
situated wholly within the public healthcare ‘reimbursement’ system, a point that we will 
return to below. Pace Pallesen (2016) and given the diversity of RM products types, it is clear 
that articulation by stakeholders of RM’s future must take account of the diverse types of 
products in the context of existing budget regimes. Thus, the classification of RM 
technologies is key to their valuation and potential recompense to producers. Our analysis 
suggests that this diversity is downplayed in many accounts amongst powerful stakeholders, 
though some commentators do consider it:  
… cell and gene therapy, I think, will have an easier route into adoption…They will 
face challenges on cost, I think but they will be straightforward challenges because 
they will be compared with current (drugs)…as we move forward into the more 
medical device type areas like orthopaedics and like wound care, I think that’s going 
to become much more complex. (Innovation network 1, 2015) 
The complexity referred to here entails different healthcare epistemic cultures, as Roscoe 
(2015) pointed out, underlying alternate potential valuations: 
… orthopaedic surgeons are used to the type of assessment that occurs for joint 
replacement…Culturally it will be quite a difficult place for them to understand the 
rigour of the assessment perhaps that medicines would have. (National body 2, 2015) 
Thus, the type of product, RM or not, or type of RM, is seen as a complicating aspect of RM 
valuation from an NHS system perspective, especially for applications that do not fit 
pharmaceutical market models. Likewise, physical infrastructure of service provision is 
related to the potential classifications of different RM therapies, hence shaping the future 
pathways for market schemes: 
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… there are new challenges in applying normal techniques that we use… what are 
you going to compare, the cost of the cell treatment to the cost of the current 
treatment…? Is it always going to be in a tertiary centre or is this going to move out 
into general medical practice? (Consultant 2, 2015) 
NICE and NHSE as the primary gatekeepers have to assess various data and ‘evidence’ for 
their ‘valuational’ assessments of RM, as other technologies. As noted, the level of 
uncertainty of clinical evidence with emerging RM products is unusually high. The 
appropriate types and ‘levels’ of evidence for RM products was a widely raised and 
contentious issue. Promoters of RM technologies argue, and some indeed lobby, for what one 
interviewee called a ‘more forgiving’ approach by technology assessors. The trade 
organisations unsurprisingly were most expansive about a need for new HTA approaches and 
methodologies:  
we’re not going to have large-scale, double-blind RCTs (Randomised Control Trials), 
we’re going to have different kinds of study which, essentially, in front of a NICE 
appraisal committee, would be viewed as lower-quality evidence. (Trade organisation 
4, 2015) 
Clinical actors confirm that long-term outcomes of certain RM techniques are simply not 
known. Referring to knee cartilage regeneration:  
costing the impact of something where you don’t know the durability of the product is 
very difficult… They’re not going to build your cartilage forever so we’re back at … 
the limits of the evidence base. (National body 2, 2015) 
The novel methodologies being promoted include ‘real world evidence’, usually taken to 
mean patient follow-up data from registries, or possibly individual patient records: 
… So we want to be able to see how real-world evidence collection can be used more 
actively in appraisals…HTA bodies are not used to having to take that kind of 
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evidence into account. (Trade organisation 4, 2015) 
Indeed, gatekeeper HTA body NICE is robust in defending its existing approaches: 
The NICE technology appraisal methods have very much been designed so that you 
can evaluate different therapies for different disease areas for different severities all 
on a level playing field, and we do that through the metric that we use (i.e the QALY) 
(Gatekeeper 3, 2015) 
A number of contentious issues were raised specifically about data that might underpin RM 
payment schemes. These especially concerned difficulties and costs of collecting appropriate 
clinical data, practical implementation of recommended therapies: 
There is a great reluctance on the part of both pharmaceutical companies and the NHS 
on the ground to enter into these schemes that involve collecting data. (Consultant 2, 
2015) 
 
Challenging the established valuation mechanism 
An important test of NICE’s capacity to deal with RM products was conducted in 2015-16. 
This consisted of an ‘exploratory study of the appraisal of example regenerative medicine 
products’ (NICE, 2016; Hettle et al, 2016). This highlighted the challenge from various 
actors, especially the innovators, to the prevailing valuation methodology of the QALY. The 
study can be understood as a testing of the machinery of valuation knowledge, though not 
going beyond the ‘reimbursement’ assumption of market transaction. It concluded that 
NICE’s existing methods were sufficiently robust and versatile:  
These results can support manufacturers and reimbursement bodies in determining 
potential commercial and health system value. The significant clinical gains provide 
support for significantly higher value based prices than current 
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technologies…However, the potential high upfront costs of these technologies may 
present additional challenges… (Hinde, 2016). 
The ‘additional challenges’ resulted in the following conclusion: 
Where there is a combination of great uncertainty but potentially very substantial 
patient benefits, innovative payment methodologies need to be developed to manage 
and share risk to facilitate timely patient access while the evidence is immature …The 
discounting rate applied to costs and benefits was found to have a very significant 
impact on analyses… (NICE, 2016, our emphasis) 
This statement can be regarded as a concession on the part of NICE, acknowledging as a 
legitimate value itself the tradeoff between ‘commercial and health system value’, expressed 
in the form of potentially flexible payment models. In other words, in Pallesen’s terms, 
conflicting definitions of the public good have been welded together in a ‘compromise’ 
position.  
 
Reviewing these data, we see that an explicit discourse of broadly defined societal value or 
the public good is not prominent. Industry interests press for more flexibility around types of 
assessment data, NICE in particular as a governance actor is resilient in maintaining its 
gatekeeping role around the ‘allocation protocol’ (Roscoe, 2016) of the QALY, implicitly at 
least maintaining the utilitarian value on population health as public good, and the 
classification of different types of RM product emerges as key in ‘articulating the future’ of 
RM in the context of existing budgetary infrastructures and professional medical cultures. 
However, we also see NICE accepting that more flexible methods of recompense for 
producers might be acceptable from both a public good point of view as well as being 
compatible with its own machineries of knowledge that construct ‘what matters’. 
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Valuation through market-building and payment scenarios 
Still within the ‘reimbursement’ paradigm, many of the institutional stakeholders discussed 
non-mainstream payment possibilities that NICE’s exploratory study pointed towards, noting 
a range of apparent flexible ‘gateways’ proposed or emerging (AUTHOR1, 2016, 2017). 
These flexible schemes include conditional authorisation and ‘early access’, payment by 
results, ‘risk-sharing’ and other ‘managed payment’ schemes, ring-fenced RM funding, and 
recompense on condition of further data. Here, for reasons of space, we present a small 
selection from our data on these alternative scenarios and methodologies. 
 
Trade associations showed major concern with the development of a RM market, outlining 
the basic principle of a financial ‘risk-sharing’ approach: 
There needs to be more flexibility to say, ‘Okay, so maybe the medicine will be 
provided at a different in-market commercial price for this period,’ but then, if the data 
supports it, the price should go up.... and it’s only if we accept that that we’re properly 
accepting that value should be linked to price. (Trade organisation 4, 2015) 
Risk-sharing schemes, in which the NHS can reclaim payments from companies in case of 
lesser than projected medical outcomes, raise issues for existing payment systems: 
some companies are sufficiently confident that they will want to sell their product on 
a ‘you won’t get billed unless we deliver that benefit to you’ and that allows multi-
year (payments) (Innovation network 1, 2015)  
Similarly: 
we’re going to say ‘if that’s all it does we’re going to pay 10% of what you set the 
price as it just hasn’t fulfilled its promise’. (Service 1, 2015)  
An ‘Early Access to Medicines’ (EAMS) scheme was introduced by market approval 
regulators in 2014, aiming to speed up clinical access to medicine deemed to have good 
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potential in the case of life threatening conditions with no alternative (‘unmet need’). The 
medicine is provided free by the producer pending data collection and licensing authorisation 
(Office for Life Sciences, 2016), which is a point of contention: 
we maintain that for the Early Access to Medicines Scheme to fully benefit patients it 
must be centrally funded and reimbursed (UK Life Sciences, 2014). 
 
Gene therapy, of which there are already examples on the market, represents the most 
extreme medical form of RM, where cure for life-threatening, intractable disease is 
envisioned. Here, we see stakeholders’ considerations of value principles and valuation 
methodologies highlighted, and conventional payment regimes most challenged. Developers 
of genetic therapies that fulfil the criteria of ‘unmet need’ can gain regulatory incentive 
advantages (Hyry, 2015), and numerous options for funding gene therapy products are being 
debated. However, it has been opined that tackling this will require a ‘revolution in the 
reimbursement environment’ (Carr and Bradshaw, 2016). Health economists have noted that 
‘Willingness to pay is typically higher in smaller patient populations’, and that outcomes 
modelling and risk-sharing agreements can address the uncertainties of trials (due to small 
numbers) in niche populations (Jorgensen and Kefalas, 2015).  The endorsement of modelling 
techniques by health economists and NICE is a very concrete example of the ‘articulation of 
the future’ through machineries of valuation knowledge. 
 
Payment options that have been discussed for gene therapy RM range from payment-by-
results to up-front lump sum payments to capped annuity with risk sharing, which Touchot 
and Flume (2015) believe is the most likely approach, noting that this would allow ‘health 
systems to spread the cost over several years and to limit risk if efficacy is not maintained’. 
However, they also opine that most healthcare systems cannot implement such an approach 
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currently (2016: 902). Notably, flexible clinical outcomes-dependent schemes necessitate 
accurate and systematic follow-up of patients, hence the emphasis on ‘real world evidence’ as 
mentioned above. While dedicated national funds for RM as a special technology are 
appealing to producers (proposed in the ‘VALUE’ report, Biolatris 2012), if anything there is 
a retreat from such approaches, as shown in the UK case with the recent reform of the Cancer 
Drugs Fund, where the socio-political allocative priority accorded cancers has been reined in 
by the cost-utility arguments of HTA and NICE (NHSE, 2016).   
 
In summary, we can see a wide range of flexible, conditional payment schemes being 
discussed and contended between the key institutions as RM and its proponents challenge 
existing infrastructures, some of which are specific to RM and some more broadly applicable. 
These scenario debates formulate schemes which would make valuation of RM products 
possible, showing a growing trend of provisional measures that would satisfy values of the 
public good in terms both of enabling access to special therapies and of providing innovation 
and market incentives to therapy developers and producers. 
 
Where value and payment meet – a clash of paradigms 
The previous sections have shown how the reimbursement market paradigm for RM has 
dominated the contentious policy discourse and option appraisals between the central 
institutional actors and the innovator stakeholders. Concern about broader, society-wide value 
regimes became acute over the last few years, with the emergence of advocacy for a 
putatively fairer system for pricing drugs – ‘value-based pricing’ – and subsequently for 
‘value-based assessment’ (VbA).  
The terms of reference (i.e. from the government Department of Health) asked NICE 
to introduce ‘a simple system of weighting for burden of illness that appropriately 
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reflected the differential value of treatments for the most serious conditions, 
encompass the differential valuation of treatments designed to extend life at the end of 
life… within a new system of burden of illness weights and include a proportionate 
system for taking account of wider societal benefits (NICE, 2014).  
Value-based pricing, however, has not been implemented. The Parliamentary Office of 
Science & Technology (POST) has stated that it floundered because:  
there were concerns over how to determine price, including how to price a drug that 
can be used to treat different conditions or patient groups (for which its value could be 
varied). Other concerns included potential discriminatory effects and how unmet 
need…, innovation and real world evidence could be taken into account… Measures 
that attempt to capture WSI (Wider Societal Impact) and BoI (burden of Illness) will 
discriminate in favour of those treatments that provide the highest value to society …. 
Conditions that predominantly effect older people … may discriminate against older 
people ... (POST, 2015).  
Although for example, drugs that help older population groups with chronic conditions to 
lead a better quality of life might be seen to have ‘high value’ in society, in fact the policy 
concern expressed here is that value accorded ‘contribution to society’ as societal impact 
might all too easily be gauged in economic terms of employment and productive work, thus 
neglecting less measurable contributions such as family and caring activity. The stalling of 
VbA is significant because it shows the difficulties that conflicting institutional stakeholders 
have in defining the public good, the societal value of novel technologies such as RM 
products, via ethically acceptable methodologies. So VbA as a methodology or machinery of 
knowledge has failed to find a place in the accepted repertoire of valuation methodologies. In 
Pallesen’s terms, we can understand VbA as an attempt to square societal-level public good 
principles with a quantitative allocative valuation tool, both of which attract controversy 
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between different stakeholder groups. Value-based assessment extended the definition of the 
public good, but some scenarios in the RM valuation debate extend beyond this. The recent 
‘value turn’ highlights this, and we briefly note broader value criteria below. 
 
Non-payment approaches to valuation  
We have been careful in this article to frame reimbursement as one possible means by which 
RM producers seek reward for their products, but other modes of reward lie outside the NHS 
as a marketplace. ‘Value’ might not lie within the bounds of healthcare-related transactions or 
even calculations of ‘societal impact’. Although a relatively rare view amongst our 
interviewees and in the key documents we have reviewed, recompense or worth in general 
was sometimes defined in a more holistic, systemic way, and this was also evident in gene 
therapy scenarios. For example, from an innovator’s point of view value might lie in adjunct 
materials to an active health technology: 
there could be a piece of plastic, software, glass, metal, or a…standard operating 
procedure… those things remain every bit as valuable, and it means that there is a lot 
of value to be had …. (Consultant 3, 2015)  
Likewise, economic consultants envision approaches that take a broader view of the public 
good and methods by which innovation can be rewarded, such as intellectual property-based 
payment including ‘prizes for patents, out-licensing of technology rights or prolonged patent 
rights’ in the case of gene therapy innovation (Carr and Bradshaw, 2015). Such a formulation 
of value breaks the mould of the conventional healthcare-centric view of reimbursement, 
taking it to a broader societal level of the overall innovation ecology. It is notable that some 
health economics thinking within the HTA community is starting to recognise this type of 
valuation approach, for example as ‘scientific spillover’ (Marsden et al, 2016), although 
policy outcomes of such considerations are yet to be formulated.   
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Discussion and conclusions 
A growing policy concern with the societal value of medical technologies in a resource-
limited system is clearly evidenced by the current turn to a value debate in the regenerative 
medicine field. We have placed the discourse of reimbursement in context of emerging 
movements mobilising different value registers in medical technology planning. We have 
illustrated how valuation is multidimensional, with institutional stakeholders mobilising their 
views on NHS and technology assessment infrastructures, the definition of RM’s appropriate 
value regimes, the methodologies and data of technology evaluation, on evidence and on 
payment scenarios. Thus differing epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Roscoe, 2015) 
shape ‘what matters’ in the stakeholder politics of RM products’ markets design. Specific 
tensions are evident between central and contending institutional stakeholders, between 
future scenarios of RM products’ introduction into public healthcare and existing inherited 
infrastructures, and between different medical specialist cultures of innovation. While there is 
some common ground between institutional stakeholders such as industry innovators and 
health system gatekeepers, there is also significant conflict. The inertia of existing payment 
systems and tariff structures is a clear impediment to reimbursement of novel technologies. 
Not only are most RM technologies themselves expensive, but ‘real world’ data collection is 
too. There is a degree of experimentation and scenario-building with novel systems, with 
different forms of ‘risk-sharing’ receiving particular attention, although with no clear 
dominant model. 
 
Within the reimbursement paradigm, the QALY as a machinery of valuation knowledge and 
managed market device remains resilient in spite of its history of controversy (Schwappach, 
2002), although the potential use of alternative valuation pathways expressing different sets 
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of value principles is a notable development. Exceptions to the mainstream assessment and 
reimbursement routes in the form of the ‘specialised’ technologies and services are 
diversifying the potential healthcare adoption pathways and payment scenarios, and 
responding to different societal and political regimes of public good values. We have shown 
clear divergence between the pharmaceutical market model in the reimbursement discourse 
and the recognition that some RM will be embedded in existing tariff structures, budgets and 
clinical service packages. Also notable is the increased attention within NICE to a role for 
modelling and discounting techniques in the face of clinical and cost-effectiveness 
uncertainties and data challenges, increasing the flexibility of the reimbursement paradigm.  
 
Turning more closely to the analytic themes that have guided our discussion, we have 
recognised Pallesen’s four dimensions of struggle in the case of RM valuation and payment 
scenarios. First, we have seen valuation as ‘the articulation of the future’, especially in the 
proposal and debate over payment scenarios, the value-based assessment debate and the 
exploration of the applicability of NICE’s machineries of knowledge to RM technology. And 
NICE’s ‘exploratory study’ extends the articulation of the future via proposals for further 
economic modelling and future outcomes-dependent payment scenarios. Further, we have 
extended this analytic theme by analysing the many features of the existing inherited 
assessment and budgetary infrastructures that innovatory fields such as RM must contend 
with. Second, we have shown alternative framings of the public good and economic benefit: 
while the wind power technology that Pallesen analyses addresses a problematisation about 
the natural environment, RM valuation is construed to address problematisations of ‘unmet 
needs’, life science industry development, and the societal value of aggregate population-
level healthcare. Third, stances toward market governance are clearly shown in the RM case. 
Rather than ‘feed-in tariffs’ (state incentives guaranteeing companies’ payments for 
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providing electricity) in a liberalised market, we see the much more state-steered market of 
national healthcare services grappling with complex biomedical innovations under 
constrained budgets in conditions of scientific and clinical uncertainty. Flexible schemes such 
as conditional authorisation and early access combine governance by incentives with 
oversight, and regulatory control over innovation – a hybrid and provisional form of 
innovation governance, that attempts to address that state-steered market. Further, the level of 
the ‘marginal’ stakeholders’ participation in reimbursement debates illustrates a level of 
albeit contentious ‘partnership governance’ with state and gatekeeping agencies, conflictual 
though it may be. Finally, Pallesen’s analysis of the struggle over the ability of valuation 
methods and calculation to produce fairness and efficiency in the system, is echoed by our 
analysis of the disputed role of the QALY as a valuation method and allocation protocol, and 
the evident calls for more flexible and adaptable valuation machineries for RM through ‘real 
world data’. Adding to this point, we can note the high complexity of contemporary 
healthcare provision and the high level of commercial medical innovation exemplified by RM 
that is resulting in a more diversified set of pathways including state-legitimated conditional 
exceptions and special considerations for certain types of product with high promise, and 
certain classes of patient such as those with rare, hitherto ‘incurable’ disease. The failure of 
Value-based Assessment can be accounted for by the different incommensurable value 
principles brought into conflict by this complex version of the public good. 
 
Unlike the case of wind power technology, which produces electricity with a high degree of 
certainty, the market of medical products is massively diverse and effectiveness of the 
products largely uncertain. Thus, in the RM cases examined here, the political discourse on 
the RM market at this stage is focused more on valuation, societal and healthcare values, and 
the infrastructures of assessment and payment systems rather than on pricing per se. RM 
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treatments for common conditions such as chronic ulcers address different markets and 
different potential payment pathways than gene therapy products offering cure for rare 
diseases. Such structures embed deep value positions that delineate subsectors of the market. 
In the RM case we have seen a plurality of non-aligned values informing the political 
negotiation of RM products’ future, notably innovation promotion and medical need on the 
one hand, and healthcare resourcing and population medical provision on the other. It is 
worth noting that the heightened entanglement of such values may be greater in the UK 
context than some other advanced states where the value of ‘unmet need’ may be accorded 
higher priority (INCa, 2018). 
 
In summary, our analysis shows that valuation debates and market- building are the sites of 
interplay of different value principles and regimes – social, ethical, economic, and health-
related.  Conflict is evident between gatekeepers and innovators over the definition and 
operationalisation of ‘value’ in payment systems, as well as there being some recognition that 
RM producers may access alternative modes of reward altogether. RM producers can obtain 
reward through systems other than commodity markets. Here, our data on reward systems for 
RM has some kinship with that of Birch (2012; 2016) who has proposed that the bioeconomy 
is developing through processes of assetization and financialization, rather than a ‘biocapital’ 
market in material, biologically derived commodities. Our data on the multiple RM 
stakeholders’ positions include some stakeholders countenancing his view, for example, that 
royalties rather than simply payments may be required as part of (some of) RM’s incentive 
structures for creating ‘value’ (Birch, 2012:198). However, our analysis shows that the 
current valuation debates around RM in the UK encompass not only capitalist value, whether 
through assetization or through commodity markets, but also broader ‘egalitarian’ (Gardner, 
2017) social public good values such as fairness, non-discrimination, equity, speed of access, 
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and population health.  The extent to which this complex interplay of values can be steered 
and aligned through policy and institutional infrastructures to achieve an acceptable mix of 
medical, healthcare, economic and social goals for the range of regenerative medicine 
products, remains an open question. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes 
1 ‘A measure of the state of health of a person or group in which the benefits, in terms of 
length of life, are adjusted to reflect the quality of life. One QALY is equal to 1 year of life in 
perfect health. QALYs are calculated by estimating the years of life remaining for a patient 
following a particular treatment or intervention and weighting each year with a quality-of-life 
score (on a 0 to 1 scale). It is often measured in terms of the person’s ability to carry out the 
activities of daily life, and freedom from pain and mental disturbance.’ 
(https://www.nice.org.uk/glossary?letter=q) 
2 Although the literature generally refers to ‘Health Technology Assessment’, NICE’s term is 
‘Technology Appraisal’. 
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